January 23, 1788.
Dear Sir,
I believe the people of the United States are
full in the opinion, that a free and mild
government can be preserved in their extensive
territories, only under the substantial forms of
a federal republic. As several of the ablest
advocates for the system proposed, have
acknowledged this (and I hope the confessions
they have published will be preserved and
remembered) I shall not take up time to
establish this point. A question then arises,
how far that system partakes of a federal
republic. I observed in a former letter, that it
appears to be the first important step to a
consolidation of the states; that its strong
tendency is to that point.
But what do we mean by
a federal republic and what by a consolidated
government? To erect a federal republic, we must
first make a number of states on republican
principles; each state with a government
organized for the internal management of its
affairs: The states, as such, must unite under a
federal head, and delegate to it powers to make
and execute laws in certain enumerated cases,
under certain restrictions; this head may be a
single assembly, like the present congress, or
the Amphictionic council; or it may consist of a
legislature, with one or more branches; of an
executive, and of a judiciary. To form a
consolidated, or one entire government, there
must be no state, or local governments, but all
things, persons and property, must be subject to
the laws of one legislature alone; to one
executive, and one judiciary. Each state
government, as the government of New Jersey
etc., is a consolidated, or one entire
government, as it respects the counties, towns,
citizens, and property within the limits of the
state. The state governments are the basis, the
pillar on which the federal head is placed, and
the whole together, when formed on elective
principles, constitutes a federal republic.
A federal republic
in itself supposes state or local governments to
exist, as the body or props, on which the
federal head rests, and that it cannot remain a
moment after they cease. In erecting the federal
government, and always in its councils, each
state must be known as a sovereign body; but in
erecting this government, I conceive, the
legislature of the state, by the expressed or
implied assent of the people, or the people of
the state, under the direction of the government
of it, may accede to the federal compact: Nor do
I conceive it to be necessarily a part of a
confederacy of states, that each have an equal
voice in the general councils. A confederated
republic being organized, each state must retain
powers for managing its internal police, and all
delegate to the union power to mange general
concerns: The quantity of power the union must
possess is one thing, the mode of exercising the
powers given, is quite a different
consideration; and it is the mode of exercising
them, that makes one of the essential
distinctions between one entire or consolidated
government, and a federal republic; that is,
however the government may be organized, if the
laws of the union, in most important concerns,
as in levying and collecting taxes, raising
troops, etc. operate immediately upon the
persons and property of individuals, and not on
states, extend to organizing the militia, etc.
the government, as to its administration, as to
making and executing laws, is not federal, but
consolidated. To illustrate my idea—the union
makes a requisition, and assigns to each state
its quota of men or monies wanted; each state,
by its own laws and officers, in its own way,
furnishes its quota: here the state governments
stand between the union and individuals; the
laws of the union operate only on states, as
such, and federally: Here nothing can be done
without the meetings of the state
legislatures—but in the other case the union,
though the state legislatures should not meet
for years together, proceeds immediately, by its
own laws and officers, to levy and collect
monies of individuals, to enlist men, form
armies, etc. Here the laws of the union operate
immediately on the body of the people, on
persons and property; in the same manner the
laws of one entire consolidated government
operate—These two modes are very distinct, and
in their operation and consequences have
directly opposite tendencies: The first makes
the existence of the state governments
indispensable, and throws all the detail
business of levying and collecting the taxes,
etc. into the hands of those governments, and
into the hands, of course, of many thousand
officers solely created by and dependent on the
state. The last entirely excludes the agency of
the respective states, and throws the whole
business of levying and collecting taxes, etc.
into the hands of many thousand officers solely
created by, and dependent upon the union, and
makes the existence of the state government of
no consequence in the case. It is true,
congress in raising any given sum in direct
taxes, must by the constitution, raise so much
of it in one state, and so much in another, by a
fixed rule, which most of the states some time
since agreed to: But this does not affect the
principle in question, it only secures each
state against any arbitrary proportions. The
federal mode is perfectly safe and eligible,
founded in the true spirit of a confederated
republic; there could be no possible exception
to it, did we not find by experience, that the
states will sometimes neglect to comply with the
reasonable requisitions of the union. It being
according to the fundamental principles of
federal republics, to raise men and monies by
requisitions, and for the states individually to
organize and train the militia, I conceive,
there can be no reason whatever for departing
from them, except this, that the states
sometimes neglect to comply with reasonable
requisitions, and that it is dangerous to
attempt to compel a delinquent state by force,
as it may often produce a war. We ought,
therefore, to inquire attentively, how extensive
the evils to be guarded against are, and
cautiously limit the remedies to the extent of
the evils. I am not about to defend the
confederation, or to charge the proposed
constitution with imperfections not in it; but
we ought to examine facts, and strip them of the
false colorings often given them by incautious
observations, by unthinking or designing men. We
ought to premise, that laws for raising men and
monies, even in consolidated governments, are
not often punctually complied with. Historians,
except in extraordinary cases, very seldom take
notice of the detail collection of taxes; but
these facts we have fully proved, and well
attested; that the most energetic governments
have relinquished taxes frequently, which were
of many years standing. These facts amply prove,
that taxes assessed, have remained many years
uncollected. I agree there have been instances
in the republics of Greece, Holland, etc. in the
course of several centuries, of states
neglecting to pay their quotas of requisitions;
but it is a circumstance certainly deserving of
attention, whether these nations which have
depended on requisitions principally for their
defense, have not raised men and monies nearly
as punctually as entire governments, which have
taxed directly; whether we have not found the
latter as often distressed for the want of
troops and monies, as the former. It has been
said that the Amphictionic council, and the
Germanic head, have not possessed sufficient
powers to control the members of the republic in
a proper manner. Is this, if true, to be imputed
to requisitions? Is it not principally to be
imputed to the unequal powers of those members,
connected with this important circumstance, that
each member possessed power to league itself
with foreign powers, and powerful neighbors,
without the consent of the head? After all, has
not the Germanic body a government as good as
its neighbors in general? And did not the
Grecian republic remain united several
centuries, and form the theater of human
greatness? No government in Europe has commanded
monies more plentifully than the government of
Holland. As to the United States, the separate
states lay taxes directly, and the union calls
for taxes by way of requisitions; and is it a
fact, that more monies are due in proportion on
requisitions in the United States, than on the
state taxes directly laid? It is only about ten
years since congress began to make requisitions,
and in that time, the monies, etc. required, and
the bounties given for men required of the
states, have amounted, specie value, to about 36
million dollars, about 24 millions of dollars of
which have been actually paid; and a very
considerable part of the 12 millions not paid,
remains so not so much from the neglect of the
states, as from the sudden changes in paper
money, etc. which in a great measure rendered
payments of no service, and which often induced
the union indirectly to relinquish one demand,
by making another in a different form. Before we
totally condemn requisitions, we ought to
consider what immense bounties the states gave,
and what prodigious exertions they made in the
war, in order to comply with the requisitions of
congress; and if since the peace they have been
delinquent, ought we not carefully to inquire,
whether that delinquency is to be imputed solely
to the nature of requisitions? Ought it not in
part to be imputed to two other causes? I mean
first, an opinion, that has extensively
prevailed, that the requisitions for domestic
interest have not been founded on just
principles; and secondly, the circumstance, that
the government itself, by proposing imposts,
etc. has departed virtually from the
constitutional system; which proposed changes,
like all changes proposed in government, produce
an inattention and negligence in the execution
of the government in being.
I am not for depending wholly on
requisitions; but I mention these few facts to
show they are not so totally futile as many
pretend. For the truth of many of these facts I
appeal to the public records; and for the truth
of the others, I appeal to many republic
characters, who are best informed in the affairs
of the United States. Since the peace, and till
the convention reported, the wisest men in the
United States generally supposed, that certain
limited funds would answer the purposes of the
union: and though the states are by no means in
so good a condition as I wish they were, yet, I
think, I may very safely affirm, they are in a
better condition than they would be had congress
always possessed the powers of taxation now
contended for. The fact is admitted, that our
federal government does not possess sufficient
powers to give life and vigor to the political
system; and that we experience disappointments,
and several inconveniences; but we ought
carefully to distinguish those which are merely
the consequences of a severe and tedious war,
from those which arise from defects in the
federal system. There has been an entire
revolution in the United States within thirteen
years, and the least we can compute the waste of
labor and property at, during that period, by
the war, is three hundred million of dollars.
Our people are like a man just recovering from a
severe fit of sickness. It was the war that
disturbed the course of commerce, introduced
floods of paper money, the stagnation of credit,
and threw may valuable men out of steady
business. From these sources our greatest evils
arise; men of knowledge and reflection must
perceive it; but then, have we not done more in
three or four years past, in repairing the
injuries of the war, by repairing houses and
estates, restoring industry, frugality, the
fisheries, manufactures, etc. and thereby laying
the foundation of good government, and of
individual and political happiness, than any
people ever did in a like time; we must judge
from a view of the country and facts, and not
from foreign newspapers, or our own, which are
printed chiefly in the commercial towns, where
imprudent living, imprudent importations, and
many unexpected disappointments have produced a
despondency and a disposition to view every
thing on the dark side. Some of the evils we
feel, all will agree, ought to be imputed to the
defective administration of the governments.
From these and various considerations, I am very
clearly of opinion, that the evils we sustain,
merely on account of the defects of the
confederation, are but as a feather in the
balance against a mountain, compared with those
which would, infallibly, be the result of the
loss of general liberty, and that happiness men
enjoy under a frugal, free and mild government.
Heretofore we do not seem to have seen danger
anywhere, but in giving power to congress, and
now nowhere but in congress wanting powers; and,
without examining the extent of the evils to be
remedied, by one step, we are for giving up to
congress almost all powers of any importance
without limitation. The defects of the
confederation are extravagantly magnified, and
every species of pain we feel imputed to them:
and hence it is inferred, there must be a total
change of the principles, as well as forms of
government: and in the main point, touching the
federal powers, we rest all on a logical
inference, totally inconsistent with experience
and sound political reasoning.
It is said, that as the federal head must
make peace and war, and provide for the common
defense, it ought to possess all powers
necessary to that end: that powers unlimited, as
to the purse and sword, to raise men and monies,
and form the militia, are necessary to that end;
and, therefore, the federal head ought to
possess them. This reasoning is far more
specious than solid: it is necessary that these
powers so exist in the body politic, as to be
called into exercise whenever necessary for the
public safety; but it is by no means true, that
the man, or congress of men, whose duty it more
immediately is to provide for the common
defense, ought to possess them without
limitation. But clear it is, that if such men,
or congress, be not in a situation to hold them
without danger to liberty, he or they ought not
to possess them. It has long been thought to be
a well-founded position, that the purse and
sword ought not to be placed in the same hands
in a free government. Our wise ancestors have
carefully separated them—placed the sword in the
hands of their king, even under considerable
limitations, and the purse in the hands of the
commons alone: yet the king makes peace and war,
and it is his duty to provide for the common
defense of the nation. This authority at least
goes thus far—that a nation, well versed in the
science of government, does not conceive it to
be necessary or expedient for the man entrusted
with the common defense and general tranquility,
to possess unlimitedly the powers in question,
or even in any considerable degree. Could he,
whose duty it is to defend the public, possess
in himself independently, all the means of doing
it consistent with the public good, it might be
convenient: but the people of England know that
their liberties and happiness would be in
infinitely greater danger from the king’s
unlimited possession of these powers, than from
all external enemies and internal commotions to
which they might be exposed: therefore, though
they have made it his duty to guard the empire,
yet they have wisely placed in other hands, the
hands of their representatives, the power to
deal out and control the means. In Holland their
high mightinesses must provide for the common
defense, but for the means they depend, in a
considerable degree, upon requisitions made on
the state or local assemblies. Reason and facts
evince that however convenient it might be for
an executive magistrate, or federal head, more
immediately charged with the national defense
and safety, solely, directly, and independently
to possess all the means; yet such magistrate,
or head, never ought to possess them, if thereby
the public liberties shall be endangered. The
powers in question never have been, by nations
wise and free, deposited, nor can they ever be,
with safety, anywhere, but in the principal
members of the national system; where these form
one entire government, as in Great Britain, they
are separated and lodged in the principal
members of it. But in a federal republic, there
is quite a different organization; the people
form this kind of government, generally, because
their territories are too extensive to admit of
their assembling in one legislature, or of
executing the laws on free principles under one
entire government. They convene in their local
assemblies, for local purposes, and for managing
their internal concerns, and unite their states
under a federal head for general purposes. It is
the essential characteristic of a confederated
republic, that this head be dependent on, and
kept within limited bounds by, the local
governments; and it is because, in these alone,
in fact, the people can be substantially
assembled or represented. It is, therefore, we
very universally see, in this kind of
government, the congressional powers placed in a
few hands, and accordingly limited, and
specifically enumerated: and the local
assemblies strong and well-guarded, and composed
of numerous members. Wise men will always place
the controlling power where the people are
substantially collected by their
representatives. By the proposed system, the
federal head will possess, without limitation,
almost every species of power that can, in its
exercise, tend to change the government, or to
endanger liberty; while in it, I think it has
been fully shown, the people will have but the
shadow of representation, and but the shadow of
security for their rights and liberties. In a
confederated republic, the division of
representation, etc. in its nature, requires a
correspondent division and deposit of powers
relative to taxes and military concerns: and I
think the plan offered stands quite alone, in
confounding the principles of governments in
themselves totally distinct. I wish not to
exculpate the states for their improper neglect
in not paying their quotas of requisitions; but,
in applying the remedy, we must be governed by
reason and facts. It will not be denied, that
the people have a right to change the government
when the majority choose it, if not restrained
by some existing compact—that they have a right
to displace their rulers, and consequently to
determine when their measures are reasonable or
not—and that they have a right, at any time, to
put a stop to those measures they may deem
prejudicial to them, by such forms and negatives
as they may see fit to provide. From all these,
and many other well-founded considerations, I
need not mention, a question arises, what powers
shall there be delegated to the federal head, to
insure safety, as well as energy, in the
government? I think there is a safe and proper
medium pointed out by experience, by reason, and
facts. When we have organized the government, we
ought to give power to the union, so far only as
experience and present circumstances shall
direct, with a reasonable regard to time to
come. Should future circumstances, contrary to
our expectations, require that further powers be
transferred to the union, we can do it far more
easily, than get back those we may now
imprudently give. The system proposed is
untried: candid advocates and opposers admit,
that it is, in a degree, a mere experiment, and
that its organization is weak and imperfect;
surely then, the safe ground is cautiously to
vest power in it, and when we are sure we have
given enough for ordinary exigencies, to be
extremely careful how we delegate powers, which,
in common cases, must necessarily be useless or
abused, and of very uncertain effect in uncommon
ones.
By giving the union power to regulate
commerce, and to levy and collect taxes by
imposts, we give it an extensive authority, and
permanent productive funds, I believe quite as
adequate to the present demands of the union, as
excises and direct taxes can be made to the
present demands of the separate states. The
state governments are now about four times as
expensive as that of the union; and their
several state debts added together, are nearly
as large as that of the union—Our impost duties
since the peace have been almost as productive
as the other sources of taxation, and when under
one general system of regulations, the
probability is, that those duties will be very
considerably increased. Indeed the
representation proposed will hardly justify
giving to congress unlimited powers to raise
taxes by imposts, in addition to the other
powers the union must necessarily have. It is
said, that if congress possess only authority to
raise taxes by imposts, trade probably will be
overburdened with taxes, and the taxes of the
union be found inadequate to any uncommon
exigencies: To this we may observe, that trade
generally finds its own level, and will
naturally and necessarily leave off any undue
burdens laid upon it: further, if congress alone
possess the impost, and also unlimited power to
raise monies by excises and direct taxes, there
must be much more danger that two taxing powers,
the union and states, will carry excises and
direct taxes to an unreasonable extent,
especially as these have not the natural
boundaries taxes on trade have. However, it is
not my object to propose to exclude congress
from raising monies by internal taxes, as by
duties, excises, and direct taxes; but my
opinion is, that congress, especially in its
proposed organization, ought not to raise monies
by internal taxes, except in strict conformity
to the federal plan; that is, by the agency of
the state governments in all cases, except where
a state shall neglect, for an unreasonable time,
to pay its quota of a requisition; and never
where so many of the state legislatures as
represent a majority of the people, shall
formally determine an excise law or requisition
is improper, in their next session after the
same be laid before them. We ought always to
recollect that the evil to be guarded against is
found by our own experience, and the experience
of others, to be mere neglect in the states to
pay their quotas; and power in the union to levy
and collect the neglecting states’ quota, with
interest, is fully adequate to the evil. By this
federal plan, with this exception mentioned, we
secure the means of collecting the taxes by the
usual process of law, and avoid the evil of
attempting to compel or coerce a state; and we
avoid also a circumstance, which never yet could
be, and I am fully confident never can be,
admitted in a free federal republic; I mean a
permanent and continued system of tax laws of
the union, executed in the bowels of the states
by many thousand officers, dependent as to the
assessing and collecting federal taxes, solely
upon the union. On every principle, then, we
ought to provide, that the union render an exact
account of all monies raised by imposts and
other taxes; and that whenever monies shall be
wanted for the purposes of the union, beyond the
proceeds of the impost duties, requisitions
shall be made on the states for the monies so
wanted; and that the power of laying and
collecting shall never be exercised, except in
cases where a state shall neglect, a given time,
to pay its quota. This mode seems to be strongly
pointed out by the reason of the case, and
spirit of the government; and I believe, there
is no instance to be found in a federal
republic, where the congressional powers ever
extended generally to collecting monies by
direct taxes or excises. Creating all these
restrictions, still the powers of the union in
matters of taxation, will be too unlimited;
further checks, in my mind, are indispensably
necessary. Nor do I conceive, that as full a
representation as is practicable in the federal
government, will afford sufficient security: the
strength of the government, and the confidence
of the people, must be collected principally in
the local assemblies; every part or branch of
the federal head must be feeble, and unsafely
trusted with large powers. A government
possessed of more power than its constituent
parts will justify, will not only probably abuse
it, but be unequal to bear its own burden; it
may as soon be destroyed by the pressure of
power, as languish and perish for want of it.
There are two ways further of raising checks,
and guarding against undue combinations and
influence in a federal system. The first is, in
levying taxes, raising and keeping up armies, in
building navies, in forming plans for the
militia, and in appropriating monies for the
support of the military, to require the
attendance of a large proportion of the federal
representatives, as two-thirds or three-fourths
of them; and in passing laws, in these important
cases, to require the consent of two-thirds or
three-fourths of the members present. The second
is, by requiring that certain important laws of
the federal head, as a requisition or a law of
raising monies by excise, shall be laid before
the state legislatures, and if disapproved of by
a given number of them, say by as many of them
as represent a majority of the people, the law
shall have no effect. Whether it would be
advisable to adopt both, or either of these
checks, I will not undertake to determine. We
have seen them both exist in confederated
republics. The first exists substantially in the
confederation, and will exist in some measure in
the plan proposed, as in choosing a president by
the house, in expelling members; in the senate,
in making treaties, and in deciding on
impeachments, and in the whole in altering the
constitution. The last exists in the United
Netherlands, but in a much greater extent. The
first is founded on this principle, that these
important measures may, sometimes, be adopted by
a bare quorum of members, perhaps, from a few
states, and that a bare majority of the federal
representatives may frequently be of the
aristocracy, or some particular interests,
connections, or parties in the community, and
governed by motives, views, and inclinations not
compatible with the general interest. The last
is founded on this principle, that the people
will be substantially represented, only in their
state or local assemblies; that their principal
security must be found in them; and that,
therefore, they ought to have ultimately a
constitutional control over such interesting
measures.
I have often heard it observed, that our
people are well-informed, and will not submit to
oppressive governments; that the state
governments will be their ready advocates, and
possess their confidence, mix with them, and
enter into all their wants and feelings. This is
all true; but of what avail will these
circumstances be, if the state governments, thus
allowed to be the guardians of the people,
possess no kind of power by the forms of the
social compact, to stop in their passage, the
laws of congress injurious to the people. State
governments must stand and see the law take
place; they may complain and petition—so may
individuals; the members of them, in extreme
cases, may resist, on the principles of
self-defense—so may the people and individuals.
It has been observed, that the people, in
extensive territories, have more power, compared
with that of their rulers, than in small states.
Is not directly the opposite true? The people in
a small state can unite and act in concert, and
with vigour; but in large territories, the men
who govern find it more easy to unite, while
people cannot; while they cannot collect the
opinions of each part, while they move to
different points, and one part is often played
off against the other.
It has been asserted,
that the confederate head of a republic at best,
is in general weak and dependent—that the people
will attach themselves to, and support their
local governments, in all disputes with the
union. Admit the fact: is it any way to remove
the inconvenience by accumulating powers upon a
weak organization? The fact is, that the detail
administration of affairs, in this mixed
republic, depends principally on the local
governments; and the people would be wretched
without them: and a great proportion of social
happiness depends on the internal administration
of justice, and on internal police. The splendor
of the monarch, and the power of the government
are one thing. The happiness of the subject
depends on very different causes: but it is to
the latter, that the best men, the greatest
ornaments of human nature, have most carefully
attended: it is to the former tyrants and
oppressors have always aimed.
